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In Defense of Geographic Disparity
Craig Allen Nard†
One of the most controversial issues in international patent law relates to “biopiracy,” which concerns the exploitation of indigenous traditional knowledge by Western1 firms without justly compensating the
keepers of the knowledge.2 A high-profile example is the neem tree controversy.3 The leaves and bark of the neem tree, which is indigenous to
India, have been used as natural pesticides and medicine by the people of
India for years.4 In the early 1990s, a multinational company, W.R.
Grace, obtained United States and European patents on pesticide products derived from the neem tree.5 One of the European patents was in-

† Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Technology, and the Arts, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. I am grateful to Olufunmilayo Arewa, Graham Dutfield, Christopher Heath F. Scott Kieff, and Marco Ricolfi for their helpful comments.
1. The term “Western” is used here to refer to the developed world; however, in the
context of traditional knowledge it is common to use the terms “North” and “South,”
whereby the North represents the developed world.
2. Traditional knowledge is susceptible to multiple definitions. See Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233,
240–42 (2001) (discussing difficulty in defining traditional knowledge); see also Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders 25, World Intellectual
Property
Organization
(April
2001),
http://www.wipo.org/globalissues/tk/ffm/report/final/pdf/part1.pdf [hereinafter Intellectual
Property Needs. In this essay, I am only concerned with technical or scientific knowledge.
As with traditional knowledge, there is no accepted definition of “biopiracy.”
Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 74, Commission on Intellectual
Property
Rights
(September
2002),
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfulllfinal.pdf.To the extent
meaning can be gleaned from examples, I am concerned with Western firms, who make a
genuine inventive contribution, but, unfortunately, fail to (1) obtain the consent of the
holders of traditional knowledge, and (2) equitably compensate the holders from rents
earned from the commercial exploitation of the invention. See generally id.
3. The controversy has been well mined by commentators. See, e.g., VANDANA
SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 69–73 (1997); Emily
Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the Commodification of Life,
22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 283-86 (1999).
4. SHIVA, supra note 3, at 69–73.
5. See, e.g., European Patent No. 0436 257 B1 (issued Sept. 14, 1994) (patenting a
“[m]ethod for controlling fungi on plants by the aid of . . . neem
oil”),http://l2.espacenet.com/espacenet/bnsviewer?CY=ep&LG=en&DB=EPD&PN=EP04
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validated as lacking novelty,6 but the validity of the American patents
remained intact. The central reason for this difference is that unlike
European patent law, the United States patent code distinguishes between
prior knowledge and use in foreign countries and prior knowledge and
use in the United States.7 Specifically, American patent law does not recognize as prior art knowledge and use in a foreign country, such as that
involved in the neem case.8
This geographic disparity in the American patent code has been the
subject of much criticism,9 most recently by Professor Margo A. Bagley
of Emory University School of Law.10 In her well-written article, Professor Bagley contends that the geographic limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 is
unconstitutional and bad policy.11 I challenge those assertions. By advocating the elimination of this geographic disparity and thereby allowing
foreign knowledge and use to serve as prior art, Professor Bagley seeks
to protect developing nations and indigenous peoples from Western
countries’ patent law regimes.12 In contrast, I argue for a proactive approach whereby patent rights serve not only to induce the commercialization of products derived from traditional knowledge, but also to compensate the keepers of traditional knowledge, while respecting the need to
conserve the host country’s biodiversity.13 Under this approach, the geographic disparity in American patent law is crucial.
Professor Bagley asserts that the geographic distinction in § 102 is
unconstitutional because it “allows the patenting of inventions in the
public domain.”14 According to Professor Bagley, the Framers of the
Intellectual Property Clause (IP Clause), expressed in Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, were skeptical of
monopolies and “sought to avoid the granting of patents on ‘old’
36257&ID=EP+++0436257B1+I+.
6. See Press Release, Eurpean Patent Office, “Neem tree oil” case: European patent
No. 0436 257 revoked (MONTH DAY, YEAR), http://www.europeanpatentoffice.org/news/pressrel/2000_05_11_e.htm. The invalidated European patent was
specifically challenged by two Indian non-governmental organizations.
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) (2000).
8. See id. Although foreign knowledge and use cannot be used as prior art, foreign
inventive activity (i.e., conception and reduction to practice) can serve as proof of date of
invention for purposes of obtaining patent rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions About Current U.S. Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001); Shayana Kadidal,
Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Tree Controversy, 37 IDEA 371 (1997).
10. See Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation
on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003).
11. See id. at 679–91.
12. See id.
13. See infra notes 36–66 and accompanying text.
14. Bagley, supra note 10, at 687.
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and “sought to avoid the granting of patents on ‘old’ information.”15
Novelty is indeed the sine qua non of patent protection, but I believe
Professor Bagley’s conception of the “public domain” is too broad and
does not fully take into account the utilitarian nature of American patent
law.16 While it is true that the Framers drafted the IP Clause in the
shadow of abusive monopolistic practices,17 the driving force behind the
clause was the enhancement of public welfare.18 Section 102 of the
patent code is consistent with utilitarianism because the geographic
distinction provides an incentive to invest in and commercialize products
derived from traditional knowledge—products that otherwise would most
likely remain undeveloped or out of reach for a vast majority of potential
beneficiaries.19 Moreover, the wealth created from commercialization
could, indeed should, be shared with the host country and keepers of the
15. Id. at 685.
16. The preamble of the IP clause, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,” is expressed in utilitarian terms. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Yochai Benkler,
Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
23, 59 (2001) (noting that “the basic ideological commitment of American intellectual
property is actually heavily utilitarian, not Lockean or Hegelian”); Linda R. Cohen &
Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. REV.
453–61 (2001) (asserting that “the conceptual model underlying American intellectual
property law is utilitarian: rights are granted for social objectives (advancing knowledge
and producing useful products)”). Compare the philosophical influences of European intellectual property law, which is grounded in Kantian and Hegelian notions of personality,
inalienability, and self-expression. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the
Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (noting that “European intellectual property
law . . . derives in large part from a concept of property developed by Immanuel Kant and
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel”).
17. See Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (“The [IP] clause is both a
grant of power and a limitation. . . . It was written against the backdrop of the practices⎯eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies⎯of the [English] Crown in
granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been
enjoyed by the public.”); see also EDWARD WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS
OF THE USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 1787-1836 39
(1998). According to one scholar, “it is precisely because the delegates were familiar with
the Statute of Monopolies . . . that they were not about to give the Congress any general
power to create monopolies. . . . If therefore they were to give power to Congress to secure
exclusive rights for limited times to inventors in their discoveries, it was necessary to do
so expressly.
18. As the Supreme Court stated in Mazer v. Stein, “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954).
19. See generally WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL
ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS
PATENT (OR NOT) PAGE, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552,
2000), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7552.v5.pdf (showing empirical evidence indicating
the importance of patent rights to the pharmaceutical industry); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 289, 289 n.1 (2003) (noting that “[v]arious empirical studies have underscored the
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deed should, be shared with the host country and keepers of the traditional knowledge.20 The prospect of a patent allows for wealth creation
and access to products based on traditional knowledge in a manner that
benefits many more people than would otherwise have benefited,21 and it
is this result the Framers sought to promote.22
Professor Bagley makes several points relating to the policy ramifications of § 102’s geographic distinction.23 Citing the neem tree example, Professor Bagley states that “[i]f [W.R.] Grace patented the same invention in the United States, where § 102(b)’s geographical limitation
would bar evidence of public use of the invention in India, European
consumers could have competitive market access to an invention only
available to U.S. consumers at monopoly pricing levels.”24 My initial response to this statement is: at least there is a product on the market. It is
reasonable to assume that, absent a geographic distinction (i.e., absent
patent rights), a pharmaceutical firm would not invest millions of dollars
in commercialization efforts, thus depriving all consumers.25 Moreover,
exploiting the patent in the rich United States market26 could lead to significant profits that would form part of a benefit-sharing arrangement.27
critical role played by patents on end-stage pharmaceutical products”); Michael A. Carrier,
Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 831 (2002) (observing
that patent incentives in pharmaceutical industry are “critical”).
20. See infra notes 49–72; see also F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 307, 317–18 (2002) (discussing how the commercialization of
products derived from biodiversity can, under a patent system, benefit the custodians of
the biodiversity).
21. It is worth noting that a significant portion of pharmaceuticals are derived from
plants. See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q.
255, 273 (1998) (“About one-quarter of all prescription drugs in the United States contain
as their active ingredient a compound extracted or derived from plants”); Thomas Eisner,
Chemical Prospecting: A Proposal for Action, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS: THE
BROKEN CIRCLE 198 (F.H. Bormann & S. Kellert eds. 1991) (“Drugs from nature make
up a large fraction of our pharmaceutical arsenal. In the United States alone, upwards of
one-quarter of all medical prescriptions involve formulations based on plant or microbial
products or on derivatives or synthetic versions thereof”).
22. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
23. See Bagley, supra note 10, at 688-91.
24. Bagley, supra note 10, at 688.
25. See infra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
26. In 2002, more than half (53.4%) of the pharmaceutical industry’s revenues were
from sales in the United States. PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD ANNUAL
REPORT 19 (2002), http://www.pmprbe.com/CMFiles/ ar2002e21LEF-6252003-6142.pdf.
Germany accounted for 6.2%, France 5.3%, the United Kingdom 3.9%, and Italy 3.7%.
Id.; see generally Jean O. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S. and
International Legal Issues, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 102–03 (2002) (proposing a patent
enforcement mechanism that would “maintain research incentives . . . limited to diseases
with markets that are concentrated in the rich countries”).
27. See infra notes 49–66 and accompanying text. It is for this reason that other
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Furthermore, Professor Bagley’s market-differential scenario is unremarkable given the lack of uniformity among patent law regimes. The
availability of a patent on any type of inventive contribution varies from
country to country, depending on eligible subject matter or a particular
reading of patentability requirements. Consider, for example, how
American patent law treats biotechnology vis-à-vis the European patent
law. In 1998, the European Parliament, concerned about the competitive
threat of a robust American biotech industry, issued a biotechnology directive codifying patent protection for biotech-related inventions.28 The
directive was over ten years in the making and has been adopted by only
a minority of EC member states, despite a deadline of July 30, 2000. One
of the principal points of contention among several countries29 and political parties30 in adopting the directive continues to be the patenting of
DNA sequences, which is stridently opposed on grounds of public morality.31 This intra-EU discordance over biotech patents highlights an important distinction between the American and European patent systems.
wealthy markets for pharmaceuticals (i.e., Europe and Japan) should amend their patent
laws and adopt a prior art geographic distinction.
28. See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July
1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 3, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13,
18 [hereinafter “European Parliament Directive”].
29. The Netherlands, who unsuccessfully brought legal action against the EU Parliament to annul the Directive, and France, are the two most prominent opponents. See
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a
Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1657 (2001). Even though the French government was not a party to the Dutch lawsuit, “French officials [were] especially vigorous
in their efforts to circumscribe the patenting of human DNA sequences. French President
Jacques Chirac [] stressed ‘the need to prevent any possibility of patenting the discovery
of a gene, except for its therapeutic or diagnostic applications.’” Id. (citations omitted)
(internal quotations marks omitted).
30. The Green Party and environmentalists have been particularly vociferous in their
opposition to the European Parliament Directive.
31. In an attempt to address this concern, Article 6(1) of the Directive states that inventions are “unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to
ordre public or morality.” European Parliament Directive, supra note 28, art. 6(1) at 18.
This section mirrors Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention, which excludes
from patent protection “inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality.” European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 53(a),
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272. For an excellent discussion of the public morality requirement in
the context of biotechnology, see Marco Ricolfi, Biotechnology, Patents and Epistemic
Approaches, 5 J. BIOLAW & BUS. (Bio-Ethix Special Supplement) 77 (2002). The public
mortality argument against patenting DNA sequences is all but a whisper in American law
circles. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from
Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 249 (2000). “Although courts once
relied on ‘moral utility’ to deny patent protection for inventions used solely for gambling
or fraud, no court has relied on this doctrine since the PTO Board of Appeals held that an
invention used solely for gambling could be patentable in the 1977 decision of Ex parte
Murphy.” Id.
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Like its counterpart in the United States, the European Patent Office
(EPO) has issued patents on human DNA.32 Contrary to the American
system, however, a patent granted by the EPO matures into individual
national patents (as designated by the applicant), which are governed by
their respective national laws. There is no such thing as a European patent that is valid throughout the entire EU. Member states, which often
have divergent interpretations of the European Patent Convention, retain
jurisdiction over issues of infringement and scope of patent protection,33
thus increasing the likelihood of disparate enforcement.34 Therefore,
while great strides have been made toward patent harmonization within
the EU and throughout the world, uniformity among nations remains unrealized.35
Professor Bagley also notes that the United States condemns the pirating of American intellectual property by trading partners, yet the geographic disparity in § 102(b) “facilitates the ‘pirating’ of unpatented, unpublished, traditional knowledge.”36 I agree that the United States has
been willing to “push and prod developing countries into accepting intellectual property rules,”37 and that Western firms should compensate
keepers of traditional knowledge.38 As Professor Balgey notes, however,

32. See http://www.pixunlimited.co.uk/guardian/pdf/Patenthuman.pdf (last visited
Sept. 1, 2003) (listing patents for partial human gene sequences).
33. See European Patent Convention, supra note 31, arts. 64, 138, 1065 U.N.T.S. at
295–96; see also Friedrich-Karl Beier, The European Patent System, in THE
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 462, 464 (Frederick Abbott et al.
eds., 1999)
34. An oft-cited example of disparate enforcement is the “Epilady” patent litigation
in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. For a history of the litigation, see
Sanford T. Colb, The Epilady Hair Remover Litigation, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SERIES 1993: SUCCESSFUL MULTI-COUNTRY PATENT LEGISLATION
STRATEGIES 107 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1993).
35. A recent example of divergent patentability requirements is the Canadian Supreme Court case involving Harvard University’s onco-mouse. See Commissioner of Patents v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, [2002] D.L.R. (4th) 577. This transgenic
mammal has been patented in several countries, but the Supreme Court of Canada refused
to extend patent protection because a higher life form, in the Court’s opinion, is not a
“composition of matter” or “article of manufacture” under Section 2 of the Canadian Patent Act. See id. at 578–79; Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 4 (1970) (Can.). Interestingly,
the Canadian Supreme Court refused to follow the lead of the famous American case,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), and its well known language: “Congress
intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”
Id. at 309.
36. Bagley, supra note 10, at 688–89.
37. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM 100 (2002)
(discussing United States’ use of “Special” 301, and amendment to Section 182 of the
Trade Act of 1974, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000)).
38. See infra notes 49–66 and accompanying text.
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traditional knowledge is unpublished39 and, I would suggest, underutilized. The virtue of a patent is its ability to “smoke out” this
knowledge and to provide an inducement for firms to develop products
derived therefrom⎯products that otherwise may not be realized. I am not
suggesting that patent rights can solve all suboptimal innovation patterns
across all industries, and I am sympathetic to concerns prompted by recent proprietary trends in intellectual property law. My focus here is only
on pharmaceuticals, an industry that relies heavily on patent rights.40
In addition, Professor Bagley argues that the geographic distinction
no longer makes sense because information is generally more accessible
today than it was in 1836, when the distinction found its way into the
patent law.41 Though the assumed rationale for the geographic limitation
may be anachronistic,42 doing away with it (and therefore the prospect of
patent rights) would obstruct wealth creation. Professor Bagley suggests,
however, that even if the geographic distinction is removed, pharmaceutical firms “can still deliver new drugs based on traditional knowledge”
as long as the drugs are novel and nonobvious.43 Perhaps, but I am not as
sanguine as she. First, the pharmaceutical company brings something to
the table by way of testing and refining products—endeavors that are
quite costly and not necessarily lacking in inventive contribution. Second, and more directly responsive, establishing and documenting the precise prior art parameters of traditional knowledge, preserved mainly in
oral histories, is a difficult undertaking.44 Blurred prior art boundaries

39. See Bagley, supra note 10, at 688–89; see also infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 19. This essay does not address the important issue of drug access
in the developing world such as that which played out in South Africa a few years ago.
Rather, I am concerned with patent law’s incentive dynamic as it relates to traditional
knowledge and notions of benefit sharing.
41. Bagley, supra note 10, at 712–24.
42. For a historical discussion of the geographic distinction in § 102, see Donald S.
Chisum, Foreign Activity: Its Effect on Patentability Under United States Law, 11 INT’L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 26, 33–42 (1980).
43. Bagley, supra note 10, at 719.
44. As Graham Baines states:
An investigator of traditional knowledge faces a daunting challenge,
and many difficulties. Irrespective of “scientific objectivity”, (sic)
differences of perception, values and language between those who
hold traditional knowledge and those who wish to document it and
apply it are significant. Unless investigators of traditional knowledge
make more effort to understand these differences and to develop effective investigative methods then, at best, incomplete revelations of
traditional knowledge will result. At worst, the information obtained
will prove misleading.
See Graham B.K. Baines, Conclusion: Issues in the Application of Traditional Knowledge
to Environmental Science, in TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: A COLLECTION
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lead to uncertainty, which is undesirable in a property rights regime.
Third, information is a classic public good,45 and, as a general matter, accessibility without exclusivity leads to serious inefficiency concerns.46
The aforementioned uncertainties brought about by a change to § 102
would weaken the prospect of a strong property right. As a result, in the
pharmaceutical industry, private ordering and benefit-sharing would suffer because traditional knowledge will not be optimally commercialized.47
While it is true that this argument can apply to domestic knowledge

OF ESSAYS

68 (Robert E. Johannes ed., 1989).
There is indeed a movement afoot to document traditional knowledge. See, e.g., The
World
Bank
Group’s
Indigenous
Knowledge
Program,
at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/index.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003). The goals of this
movement, however, must be defined. According to the World Bank, the “ultimate objective” of its internet-based indigenous knowledge program “is to help mainstream indigenous/traditional knowledge into the activities of development partners and to optimize the
benefits of development assistance, especially to the poor.” Id. If the goal is to create patent-destroying prior art, then this movement seems to be misguided for reasons discussed
in this essay, but it makes sense if the goal is to provide for a centralized database of traditional knowledge with an eye towards commercial exploitation. One must be careful,
however, not to disclose too much, lest prior art be created. As Professor Coenraad Visser
noted, “[i]f you want to exploit the traditional knowledge by means of compilation or a
transfer technology agreement, then it is in your interest to disclose as little as possible in
the agreement.” Coenraad Visser, Panel Remarks at Fordham Law School Symposim on
Global Intellectual Property Rights, in The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 753, 768 (2002). He goes on to suggest that the “solution . . . seems to be to tag
only . . . [s]o you would list in the database only the items that are available for the transfer of technology.” Id.
45. Public goods have two characteristics. They are nonrival (i.e., inexhaustible) and
nonexclusive. A good is nonrival if consumption by one person does not leave any less of
the good to be consumed by others. A good is nonexclusive if people cannot be excluded
from consuming it. In addition to information, other public goods include national defense,
television signals, and police protection.
46. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 102ND CONGRESS, FINDING A
BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 (1992). According to a report by the Office of Technology
Assessment, “Individuals have an incentive not to pay for the good, or to undervalue it, in
hopes of getting access as ‘free riders.’ The inability to exclude free riders distorts market
signals and is thought to result in inefficient allocation of resources to nonexclusive goods
and underproduction of them, relative to socially optimal quantities.” Id. For a more detailed discussion of public goods and the market failures associated with them, see
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 33–38, 107–10, 120–22, 167–
72 (2004).
47. For a discussion of a commercialization-based patent system supported by a
strong property right, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, PAGE (2001); see also Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, PAGE (1977); Giles
S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws (pts. 1–5),
24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942).
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(i.e., knowledge within the United States), it is not my intent to read the
knowledge and use provisions out of the patent code. Rather, I believe
there is something special about traditional knowledge in developing
countries. Specifically, the patenting and commercial exploitation of
products based on their traditional knowledge can bring much needed
capital to these countries and their indigenous populations.48
Professor Bagley and I are on common ground when she argues that
indigenous peoples deserve to be compensated for the commercial exploitation of their traditional knowledge.49 This concern is important,
however the problem here is not the availability of patent protection but
rather the lack of an adequate compensatory mechanism for developing
nations and indigenous peoples.50 Safeguards must be put in place so as
to prevent “biopiracy” similar to the Hoodia cactus incident.51 The availability of patent protection must be accompanied by a compensatory
structure and mutual consent so that the keepers of traditional knowledge
will be equitably compensated, the sovereignty of the host nation respected, and its biodiversity conserved.
One way to accomplish these goals is through a contractual arrangement and a notification provision52 that are consistent with the aims
48. Even if traditional knowledge were properly catalogued and thus rendered prior
art under the current version of § 102, we may nonetheless want to treat this prior art as
non-patent defeating. That is, if our goal is to provide incentives to commercialize products derived from traditional knowledge and enhance benefit-sharing opportunities, it may
be desirable to have a developing nation prior art exception. This proposal may also help
address the “how much to disclose” problem associated with documentation efforts discussed by Professor Visser. See supra note 44.
49. See Bagley, supra note 10, at 689 (noting the lack of equitable compensation for
use of traditional knowledge).
50. See Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273 (asserting “that the exploitation of traditional
peoples and communities, including holders of [traditional knowledge], is fundamentally
due to a widespread failure to respect their basic rights”).
51. In 1996, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in South Africa isolated and patented the active hunger-suppressing component, P57, of the Hoodia
cactus. See Ginger Thompson, Bushmen Squeeze Money from a Humble Cactus, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at A-4. The patent was subsequently licensed to the British firm,
Phytopharm, who in turn licensed the patent to Pfizer for $21 million in payments. See
Antony Barnett, In Africa the Hoodia Cactus Keeps Men Alive. Now Its Secret Is ‘Stolen’
to Make Us Thin, OBSERVER, June 17, 2001, http://education.guardian.co.uk/print/
0,3858,4205467-102275,00.html. The San people, who have known about the hungersuppressant qualities of the Hoodia cactus for thousands of years, were not told of the
commercialization of the patented product and did not receive any remuneration from the
sales thereof. Id. In fact, the Pfizer spokesman thought the San people were extinct. Id.
After an international uproar, CSIR entered into an agreement with the San people recognizing their traditional knowledge and paying them six percent of the royalties made from
sales of the patented product. Id.
52. A full discussion of the notification requirement is beyond the scope of this essay. Such a requirement, however, could resemble the proposal made by the Colombian
delegation at the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Third Session of the Standing
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of patent law and biodiversity conservation. To this end, it is preferable,
as Professor Marco Ricolfi has argued, to amend the domestic patent
laws of developed countries to require lawful acquisition of genetic resources and an equitable compensatory arrangement based on the commercial exploitation of these resources.53 A less satisfactory, though
Committee on the Law of Patents. See Protection of Biological and Genetic Resources,
WIPO,
WIPO
Doc.
SCP/3/10
(Sept.
8,
1999),
http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/session_3/pdf/scp3_10.pdf. The proposal stated:
Every document shall specify the registration number of the contract
affording access to genetic resources and a copy thereof where the
goods or services for which protection is sought have been manufactured or developed from genetic resources, or products thereof, of
which one of the member countries is the country of origin.
Id. Consent could be subsumed within the duty to disclose all information material to patentability under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2002) (detailing the duty to
disclose material information regarding patentability). A failure to obtain consent or
fraudulently obtained consent can be sanctioned by a finding of inequitable conduct. See
Willem Pretorius, TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level is the Playing Field?, in
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT
183, 187–88 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) (arguing for a registration requirement in TRIPS); see also Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origins of
Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing
the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371,
PAGE (2000).
53. See Ricolfi, supra note 31, at 85. According to Professor Ricolfi, “a missing link
is bound to remain unless appropriate cooperation by recipient states is not . . . put in
place.” Id. In addition to domestic action, many countries, organizations, and scholars
have argued that TRIPS, which does not address protection of traditional knowledge,
should be amended to reflect the need for equitable compensation and consent, thereby
aligning TRIPS more closely with the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)⎯an “international legal framework that has sought to encourage the formation of mutually beneficial
relationships between providers and users of genetic resources based on a concept of bilateral agreement.” See, e.g., Michael I. Jeffrey Q.C., Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing Under the Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 747, 749, 773 (2002); see also Convention on
Biological Diversity, arts. 8(j), 16, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (describing the guidelines for conserving and transferring traditional knowledge via equitable
contractual arrangement); Kamal Puri, Biodiversity and Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 82, 84–85 (Chisum et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the
differences between TRIPS and CBD). For instance, Kenya, on behalf of the African
group, proposed a footnote be added to Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS to provide for “the protection of the innovations of indigenous and local farming communities in developing
countries, consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources.” Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b) ¶
13(i), Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W163 (Nov. 8, 1999), http://docsonline.wto.org/ddfdocuments/t/IP/C/W163.doc. The
WTO, in its recent Doha Ministerial Declaration, instructed the Counsil for TRIPS to “examine . . . the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.” Ministerial Declaration ¶ 19, Ministerial Conf., 4th Sess., WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 1999),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/min01/DEC1.doc (adopted Nov. 14, 1999). Oxfam has recom-
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workable, approach is to encourage the formation of voluntary contractual relationships between the keepers of traditional knowledge and those
who desire it. A prominent example is the bioprospecting agreement54
entered into between the Instituto Nacional de Biodiveridad (INBio),55 a
private, non-profit, Costa Rican organization, and Merck, the U.S. pharmaceutical company.56 The terms of the Merck agreement are confidential, but it is known that Merck paid INBio $1.35 million in return for
10,000 samples of flora, soil, and insects collected by INBio and for in-

mended that the “TRIPS regime should be harmonised (sic) with the Convention on Biodiversity.” Oxfam, Cut the Cost—Patent Injustice: How World Trade Rules Threaten the
Health of Poor People, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/cutthecost/downloads/patent.pdf (Feb.
2001); see also Pretorius, supra note 52, at 187–88 (asserting that “TRIPS should . . . contain a requirement that the enforcement of patent rights should be subject to the disclosure,
at the time of registration, of the country of origin of biological materials and/or traditional
knowledge”). The United States, however, has resisted amendments to TRIPS relating to
traditional knowledge, prompting commentators such as Professor Graham Dutfield to
remark, “It seems highly unlikely that a new framework to protect [traditional knowledge]
will be inserted into TRIPS anytime soon.” Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273.
54. I use this term only to refer to a mutually beneficial contract between a developing nation and either a private concern (e.g., a pharmaceutical company) or a developed
nation. Sometimes these agreements are referred to as “Material Transfer Agreements”
(MTAs). See generally Secretariat, Operational Principles for Intellectual Property
Clauses of Contractual Agreements Concerning Access to Generic Resources and Benefit
Sharing 6, WIPO Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. And Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 2d Sess., WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/3 (Sept. 10,
2001), http://www.wipo.org/eng/meeting/2001/igc/pdf/grtkfic2_3.pdf (DATE) (explaining
the usage of the term “MTA”) [hereinafter WIPO Operational Principles]. A properly
drafted bioprospecting agreement should be consistent with the goals of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). See supra note 53; see also WIPO Operational Principles,
supra (providing information on extant contractual practices and related intellectual property clauses for access to and benefit-sharing of genetic resources); McManis, supra note
21, at 270 (noting that a “consensus is developing among scientists, world bodies, anthropologists, and conservationists, that the best way for developing countries to capture the
benefits of biodiversity is through a system of intellectual property, environmental, and
contractual protection designed to harmonize the goals of development and conservation
by building an international framework for sustainable biodiversity prospecting”).
55. INBio states that it is an “institution leader in the search and popularization of
the knowledge about biodiversity and its sustainable uses” and its mission is to “[p]romote
a new awareness of the value of biodiversity, and thereby achieve its conservation and use
to improve the quality of life.” Instituto Nacional de Biodiveridad, at
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/default.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
56. See Christopher Joyce, Prospectors for Tropical Medicines, NEW SCIENTIST,
Oct. 19, 1991, at 36, 36–39 (describing the Merck/INBio agreement). INBio also has numerous contractual arrangements with other private companies and academic institutions.
See, e.g., Agreements with Academia, Instituto Nacionale de Biodiversidad, at
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/
academicos.htm (DATE) (listing INBio’s academic agreements); Agreements with the
Industrial
Sector,
Instituto
Nacional
de
Biodiversidad,
at
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/comerciales.htm (listing INBio’s industrial agreements)
(last visited Sept. 1, 2003).

IN DEFENSE OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY.NARD.REV

232

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

10/16/2003 1:09 PM

[Vol 88:221

formation about how these samples have been traditionally used.57 Merck
is also obligated to pay INBio royalties on future sales of products developed from the samples, which in turn are to be invested, in part, in conservation efforts.58
The seed for this type of contractual agreement was planted by the
idea of “chemical prospecting,” which Thomas Eisner, who coined the
phase, defined as an “exploratory process by which new, useful natural
products are discovered.”59 Eisner advocated that developing nations, because of their geographic proximity to and interest in conserving their
biodiversity, could act as screening laboratories that would, in a noninvasive manner, search natural products for chemical and biological activities and isolate the active components of these products.60 According
to Eisner:
The inevitable follow-up to the discovery of chemical uses of selected organisms
would be the establishment of working linkages with universities and industries⎯initially, perhaps, mostly in developed nations⎯that would undertake the
characterization and synthesis of the active chemicals uncovered. At that stage,
proprietary arrangements could be made to insure that profits derived from the
eventual commercialization of the new chemicals revert in fair measure to the
nations that did the screening.61

57. See Frank J. Penna & Coenraad J. Visser, Cultural Industries and Intellectual
Property Rights 390, 397, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
58. See Bioprospecting Agreement, Insituto Nacional de Biodiversidad, at
http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/acuerdos.htm. INBio describes their bioprospecting agreements as follows:
Each agreement has its corresponding work plan and research budget that establishes a 10% donation to the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (MINAE) (Ministry of the Environment and Energy), which helps cover direct biodiversity conservation costs. Furthermore, it contributes to increasing services, species
identification, sample collection and preparation, collection records, information
management, training, management. . . .
...
In prospecting, the processes are executed in conjunction with research centers, universities, and national and international companies. This network of associations makes state-of-the-art technologies available and provides the opportunity to rapidly and efficiently train Costa Rican scientists as well as laboratory
and field personnel. At the same time, this type of collaboration generates financial resources that are used to fund the country’s conservation activities, and also
other research projects oriented towards satisfying the demands of users who
contribute to the country’s sustainable development.
Id.
59. Eisner, supra note 19, at 196.
60. See id. at 200–01.
61. Id. at 201; see also Bioprospecting Agreements, Insituto Nacional de Biodiversidad, at http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/pdb/acuerdos.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2003). Other
prominent examples of bioprospecting arrangements include efforts made by the National
Cancer Institute (NCI). See generally Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity
Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J.
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The nature and nuances of bioprospecting agreements are complex
and variable,62 and they are not without problems.63 Particularly troubling issues include asymmetrical bargaining power, domestic technology-transfer management (e.g., the ability to screen and organize traditional knowledge and representative legitimacy at the bargaining table),
and internal institutional concerns (e.g., the establishment of a legal
framework or comparable structure that recognizes and properly assigns
ownership interests in traditional knowledge; determines who should collect, manage, and equitably distribute royalties; and monitors such to assure probity in the collection and distribution).64
TRANSNAT’L L. 703, 719–24 (1995) (detailing the efforts of the NCI). The NCI has
awarded millions of dollars to non-profit organizations to engage in research in biodiversity-rich countries in Central and South America, Asia, and Africa. Id. Although under the
contracts the NCI will own any resulting patent rights, the developing country will receive
royalty payments, a representative from that country will be listed as a co-discover, and
the NCI will offer technical training to local personal. Id. The NCI’s “Letter of Collection”
states:
While investigating the potential of natural products in drug discovery and development, NCI wishes to promote conservation of biological diversity, and
recognizes the need to compensate source country organizations and peoples in
the event of commercialization of a drug developed from an organism collected
within their borders. . . . The NCI will make sincere efforts to transfer knowledge, expertise, and technology related to drug discovery and development to
the [appropriate Source Country Institution] in [Source Country] as the agent
appointed by the [Source Country Government or Source Country Organization], subject to the provision of mutually acceptable guarantees for the protection of intellectual property associated with any patented technology.
National Cancer Institute, Letter of Collection, ¶¶ 1–2 (obtained from correspondence with
Dr. Gordon Cragg, National Products Branch, NCI) (on file with the author). The NCI’s
“Memorandum of Understanding” uses virtually identical language. Two commentators
have called the NCI “one of the leaders in implementing the mandates of the Biodiversity
Convention.” Asebey & Kempenaar, supra, at 720.
62. For a discussion of the principles and operation of contractual arrangements relating to traditional knowledge, see WIPO Operational Principles, supra note 54.
63. The agreement between INBio and Merck has been criticized by a variety of authors. See, e.g., Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 61, at 726–30; Neil D. Hamilton, Who
Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28
TULSA L.J. 587, 627–29 (1993); Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical
Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223, 234–35 (1993); Kirsten Peterson, Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing Countries, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 277, 288–89 (1992); see generally Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning
Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 111, 141–45 (1996)
(criticizing the current system of preserving biodiversity).
64. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE PAGE (2000) (discussing the institutional problems in the developing world associated with managing capital and recognizing property rights); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE
ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM PAGE (1989) (same). A partial solution to these concerns is to create a non-profit organization as a centralized coordinating entity. But as Professor Visser has experienced from his work in Venezuela, the indigenous tribes have concerns about the creation of a corporate entity. See Visser, supra note 44, at 769–70. He
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Nonetheless, these contractual arrangements are a positive development. They reflect an implicit concession that developing nations
should be compensated for their traditional knowledge and that developed countries have a vested interest in biodiversity conservation. Bioprospecting agreements also create wealth for keepers of the traditional
knowledge and developing nations, wealth that can be invested in,
among other things, research and development, health care, conservation,
or general infrastructure.65 Moreover, developing nations and indigenous
peoples do not incur the often prohibitively high cost of obtaining and
enforcing patent rights.66 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, bioprospecting agreements will yield the commercialization of medicines
that will benefit many more lives than would be the case absent a meeting of the minds.
While there is a tendency to adopt a paternalistic attitude when discussing patent rights and the developing world, and while Western notions of property rights frequently differ from those of indigenous peoples,67 it is worth noting the results of an extensive empirical study
conducted by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).68 In
1998 and 1999, WIPO conducted nine fact-finding missions in twentyeight countries to discern the “IP needs and expectations of TK
[traditional knowledge] holders.”69 These missions resulted in several interesting findings; most notably, WIPO found that “[d]espite criticism of
IP laws . . . by certain informants, many others expressed interest in exploring further the actual and potential role of the IP system in TK protection,”70 and informants also expressed the desire to facilitate a “dialogue and contact between TK holders, the private sector, governments,
[non-governmental organizations], and other stakeholders to assist in
developing modalities for cooperation between them, at community, national, regional and international levels.”71 As the Indigenous Peoples
Secretariat submitted, the WIPO report “could focus on the fact that [the]
states that the tribal elders “see the corporation as supplanting the traditional authority
structure in the tribes.” Id. at 770.
65. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
66. See Penna & Visser, supra note 57, at 397 (asserting that a “basic problem” with
holders of traditional knowledge obtaining patents themselves “is that a patent protects
active ingredients that have been isolated and tested” and “[s]uch isolation and testing may
cost hundreds of millions of dollars and are out of reach for most developing countries, let
alone their indigenous peoples”).
67. See, e.g., Kamal Puri, Cultural Ownership and Intellectual Property Rights PostMabo: Putting Ideas Into Action, 9 INTELL. PROP. J. 293, 307–09 (1995) (arguing that
Aboriginal communities and Western ideas of copyright differ).
68. See Intellectual Property Needs, supra note 2.
69. See id. at 17.
70. Id. at 223.
71. Id. at 218.
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commodification [of traditional knowledge] . . . does not per se work to
the detriment of the rights of traditional knowledge holders, but, under
appropriate conditions to be further investigated and defined, can in fact
work to their benefit.”72
Further investigation of the virtues and problems of patent rights in
the developing world is in order, but given the promise of contractually
marrying proprietary rights with traditional knowledge, cautious optimism is also in order. And while Professor Bagley provides an important
alternative, I believe that a proactive use of patent law compares favorably to a system that seeks to render patent protection unavailable for
products derived from traditional knowledge.

72. Id.

